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MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW
Tnt SCINTILLA Rua or EvrNrxce.-In analyzing the reasons why "trial
by jury has declined to such an extent that it has come in many cases to be
an avowed maxim of professional action,--a good case is for the court; a
bad case is for the jury,"-JuDx DxioN, in his LAwS AND JURISPRUDZNCP,
pp. 130-2, credits "the false principle known as the scintilla doctrine" with a
large degree of responsibility.
The scintilla rule is essentially a medieval product. Scholasticism centered
in logic, and the schoolmen contemplated everything in the glass of Aris-
totelian formulae. The syllogism was the great weapon of logical conquest,
and the syllogism was deductive. It required a universal for its starting
point. It exactly reversed the modern notion of looking to experience for
data on which to build up general rule%. It started with the general rule,
which it derived abstractly. Once derived, it became, like the bed of Pro-
crustes, the standard which experience must be forcibly made to fit. The
doctor of laws in determining what cases should go to the jury, and the
doctor of theology in deciding what souls should be saved, would apply
an identical principle--conformity to a preconception. The fact that in
either case the result might be unreasonable was of no consequence. It
was heresy to deny the premise and folly to deny the conclusion.
The preconception on which the scintilla rule rests is that all questions of
fact must go to the iury. And the reason for this is that it is a maxim of
the common law that "ad quaestionem facti non respondent judices." The
scholastic mind is satisfied with this reason. It is based on authority; it keeps
practice subordinate to theory and thus maintains the medieval conception
of the ascendency of the universal over the individual; it offers the infallible
test of logic instead of the uncertain test of experience.
The essence of the scintilla rule is the total elmination of the question of
the weight of the evidence from the consideration of the court. All relevant
evidence should look alike, for the court, endowed only with a vision for the
universal, can see in all evidence only a question of relevancy. It stands
indifferent between the most convincing evidence on one side and the weight
of a hair on the other. The court, being the instrumentality of logic, not
common sense, is not expected or allowed to apply any rule but the rule of
logic. Hence nothing is judicially absurd unless it is illogical, no matter how
absurd it may be in its practical results.
The scintilla rule is seldom followed by modern courts. THompsoN says
it is "hardly mentioned by any court but to be repudiated." TRIALS, Sec.
NOTE AND COMMENT
2246, note. Here and there a court has adhered to it literally. Holtzclaw v.
Moore (Tex. Ct. of Civ. App.) 192 S. W. 582; Chicago and Erie RR. Co. v.
Hamerick, 5o Ind. App. 425. Kentucky adheres to it but admits its absurdity.
Farmers' Batik v. Birk, 179 Ky. 761. In South Carolina the rule is followed
in name but repudiated in substance by defining a "scintilla" to mean such
evidence as is sufficient to warrant a reasonable jury in rendering a verdict
upon it. Dutton v. Ati. Coast Line RR. Co., 104 S. C. i6.
Most courts lay down some rule as to the weight of evidence which will
justify sending a case to the jury, and while the wording of the rules varies
widely, in substance they all amount to this, that the evidence must have
sufficient weight to make a verdict in accordance with it reasonable. Most
commonly it is said that the case is for the jury if reasonable minds could
differ in regard to it. Virgilio v. Walker, 254 Pa. 241; Carolina, C. & 0. Ry.
Co. v. Stroup, 230 Fed. 75; Aiken v. Atl. Life Ins. Co. (N. C. 1917) 92 S. E.
184; Bank of Cortland v. Maxey, ioz Neb. 2o; Conway v. Monidah Trust,
51 Mont. 13; Sartain v. Walker (Okl. i9x6) i59 Pac. io96; Brown v. Thomas,
i2o Va. 763. Some cases say the test is whether the jury could find the fact
sought to be proved without acting unreasonably in the eye of the law. Wil-
cox v. Internat. Hare. Co., 278 Ill. 465; Stewart v. Ill. Cent. RR. Co., 201 Ill.
App. 187. Some require the evidence to be such that the jury might lawfully
find in accordance with it. Thiesen v. Gulf, F. & A. Ry. Co. (Fla., 1918), 78
So. 491. Some say the evidence must-be sufficient to sustain the case. Crom-
well v. Chance Marine Const. Co., 131 Md. xos. Some courts send the case
to the jury if there is any substantial evidence. Treble v. Am. Steel Fousn-
dries (Mo. 1916) 185 S. W. 179. Other courts say the evidence must be such
as to zoarrant the jury in finding a verdict, Zeigrist v. Speer, 29 Del. 43Y; Mc-
Alinden v. St. Maries Hospital Assn., 28 Ida. 657; or must authorize the jury
to so find, Moore v. Dixie ins. Co., ig Ga. App. 8oo. In New York a verdict
may be directed when the evidence is such that a contrary verdict must,.not
merely may, be set aside. Getty v. W4illiams Silver Co., 221 N. Y. 34. In the
federal courts and in some states the rule is that if the evidence is of so
conclusive a character that the court would feel bound to set aside a verdict
in opposition to, it, then a verdict should be directed. Canadian Northern Ry.
Co v. Senske, 2o Fed. 637; Kalish v. White, 36 Cal. App. .6o4; Meyer v.
Houck, 85 Iowa, 319; Baxter v. Brandenburg, 137 Minn. 259.
Such being the principle underlying the scintilla rule and the state of the
law regarding it, it is rather interesting and surprising to find the supreme
court of Ohio, in an opinion published in September of the present year,
standing pat on the scintilla rule in its crudest form. In Clark v. McFarland
(Ohio, 1918) I24 N. F. 164, it appeared that a will had been admitted to
probate by the order of the proper court. This order was by statute declared
to be prima facie evidence of the due execution and validity of the will. A
contes~t was then brought, and since the contestant failed to present any sub-
stantial evidence of invalidity, the trial court directed a verdict for the de-
fendant. On appeal the judgment was reversed on the ground that a mere
scintilla of evidence was enough to send the case to the jury even in the
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face of an order of probate declared by statute to be prima facie proof of
validity. Not only was the case on its merits a very extreme, one in which
to apply the rule, but two prior decisions of the Court of Appeals of Ohio
were thereby overruled. A dissenting opinion by JoNas, J., in which no other
judge concurred, argued that the statute referred to made the scintilla rule
inapplicable to will contests, but did not question the propriety of the rule
as a general principle of law. Evidently the Ohio Supreme Court feels irre-
vocably committed to this all but obsolete doctrine, and a statute will prob-
ably be necessary to get rid of it. E. R. S.
